Why drones are hard to stop
Small drones fly low, are made mostly of plastic, and are cheap enough to use in numbers. A first-person-view (FPV) drone can cross a kilometre in under a minute. Radar built for aircraft often misses them, and by the time one is seen or heard it is usually too late to react.
Counter-drone systems, also called counter-UAV or C-UAS systems, deal with this by attacking the one thing almost every drone depends on: radio. A drone needs a control link from its pilot, usually sends video back, and normally uses satellite navigation. Each of those is a signal that can be detected, and each can be disrupted.
Step 1: detect
Most modern detectors are passive. They transmit nothing. They listen across a wide band, typically from a few hundred megahertz to 6 GHz, for the control and video signals drones use. Because they emit nothing, they cannot be located by the other side and do not interfere with anything.
A good detector covers 360° and picks up a drone's signal several kilometres away in open ground, less in a city where buildings block and reflect radio. It will often detect the controller as well as the drone.
Step 2: identify and locate
The signal itself carries information. Different drone makers and control systems use recognisable protocols, so the detector can report the type, and for many commercial drones the model and serial number. This is what makes whitelisting possible: friendly drones are recognised and ignored.
To find where the drone is, detectors use direction finding. By comparing the signal across several antennas, a single unit gives a bearing, typically accurate to within 5° to 10°. Two units in different places give two bearings, and where they cross is the drone's position.
Step 3: jam
A jammer transmits noise or crafted signals on the frequencies the drone is using, so the drone can no longer hear its pilot. There are three things to jam:
- The control link. The drone stops receiving commands.
- The video link. The pilot loses the picture. This matters most against FPV drones, which are flown entirely through the camera.
- Satellite navigation. The drone no longer knows where it is.
Jammers are either directional, a narrow beam aimed at the drone, or omnidirectional, covering all around. Directional jamming reaches further on the same power and disturbs less around it. Vehicle systems often use several directional units facing different ways to get all-round cover.
FPV drones need different treatment. Home-built FPV drones use long-range control systems on lower frequencies than commercial camera drones, and they change frequency rapidly. Equipment built only for commercial drones can miss them entirely, which is why counter-FPV units are a separate category.
Step 4: spoof
Spoofing does not block the navigation signal. It replaces it. A spoofer transmits a weak, false satellite navigation signal that the drone accepts as real. The drone then believes it is somewhere else and, depending on its programming, holds position, turns back or lands.
Because the power involved is tiny, spoofing disturbs far less of the surrounding radio environment than jamming does, which suits sites near towns or airfields.
Why software-defined radio matters
Drone makers change frequencies and protocols constantly. A jammer built with fixed hardware for last year's frequencies is soon out of date. Software-defined radio (SDR) equipment generates its signals in software, so new bands and protocols are added by an update, not by replacing the unit. SDR also allows jamming codes matched to the target signal, which is more effective per watt than plain noise.
Putting it together: command and control
A single detector or jammer protects a small area. A base or a convoy needs many, and someone has to decide which one responds to which drone. A command and control platform puts every detector, jammer and spoofer on one map, shows the tracks, raises alerts and can run a response plan automatically, around the clock.
What radio countermeasures cannot do
Everything above depends on the drone using radio. Two kinds of drone do not:
- Fibre-optic drones carry their control and video down a thin cable that unreels behind them. There is no radio link to detect or jam.
- Pre-programmed drones fly a set route using inertial sensors or image matching, with no pilot in the loop.
Against these, electronic systems give little or no protection. The remaining layer is physical protection around the points that matter most. MDT's engineering division also designs passive physical protection for fixed sites, on enquiry.
A layered defence
No single method stops every drone, so real defences are layered: passive detection for early warning, jamming and spoofing for drones that depend on radio, physical protection for the ones that do not, and a control platform to tie it together. The AT-series counter-UAV systems cover the electronic layers from a single soldier to a fixed site.